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Abstract: Academic writing on the place and status of religious tribunals in western 
societies has focused upon the ‘minorities within minorities’ debate: the extent to which 
States should intervene to ensure that the citizenship rights of female group members are 
protected and that religious tribunals do not discriminate on grounds of sex.  In a number of 
recent publications following the Cardiff research on Social Cohesion and Civil Law: 
Marriage, Divorce and Religious Courts, it has been suggested that the concept of consent 
should be a key focus in determining whether the State should intervene. However, this 
article asks instead whether the focus should be on the question of autonomy.  In particular, 
this article examines the need to understand the debate concerning religious tribunals within 
the wider context of changes within family law where an emphasis has been placed upon 
individual autonomy. It also compares, explores and critiques the concept of ‘relational 
autonomy’ as discussed by Jonathan Herring in the context of family law. We agree that 
developing a concept of autonomy based on the forming of relationships rather than the usual 
focus on the autonomy of the religious group or on the individual autonomy of those who use 
religious tribunals provides a way forward. However, we propose a modification of 
relational autonomy using relational contract theory to employ a relational approach that is 
ultimately rooted in contract theory. We conclude that Feminist Relational Contract Theory 
(FRCT) – a theory previously applied to prenuptial agreements –provides, the most 
appropriate framework in which power imbalances within religious tribunals can be 
recognised. 
 
Introduction: The Story so Far 
In recent years, the operation of religious tribunals in Western societies has proved to be 
controversial. A lecture on the topic by the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan 
Williams, was the watershed moment.
3
  In that lecture, Williams raised the question of ‘what 
it is like to live under more than one (legal) jurisdiction’ and how (and how far) the civil law 
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of the land should recognise or accommodate a legal pluralism based on religious adherence. 
He suggested that ‘we have to think a little harder about the role and rule of law in a plural 
society of overlapping identities’. This caused uproar: a succession of senior figures came out 
to condemn Williams’ thinking,4 while the television news graphically illustrated the item 
with footage of stonings. However, the heat of the immediate media and political coverage, 
gave way over time to light shed thanks to a number of academic studies.
5
The debate 
concerning Sharia law has come to focus on the ‘minorities within minorities’ issue: the 
concern that deference to the religious group may reduce the rights and obligations that a 
person would ordinarily enjoy by virtue of their citizenship of the State,  particularly where 
the polity of the group differs from that of the State as regards gender roles.
6
  A question that 
has emerged is whether and, if so, when the State should intervene in the decision of a 
religious tribunal in order to ensure that there is no discrimination or other unlawful treatment 
on grounds of sex. 
 
One answer to this question that has often been given is that the focus should be on the issue 
of consent.  Religious tribunals should only operate a consensual jurisdiction. This has arisen 
in the work of Ayelet Shachar, particularly her monograph Multicultural Jurisdictions which 
calls for the recognition of ‘joint governance’, that is, the recognition that ‘minorities within 
                                                 
4
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(2008) 161 Law and Justice 75. 
5
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(Edinburgh University Press 2010) chapter 7 and for the general debate see  R Grillo, Muslim Families, Politics 
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(Palgrave, 2012) and the ‘Social Cohesion and Civil Law: Marriage, Divorce and Religious Courts’ Research 
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UK (British Academy, 2012) 27-28.Shachar has referred to this as the ‘paradox of multicultural vulnerability’, 
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Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights (Cambridge University Press, 
2001)3. While inter-group equality is concerned with establishing equal treatment between cultural and 
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minorities’ (like all group members) owe allegiance to both the group and the State and 
therefore should be able to rely upon the legal rights, privileges and obligations that they 
enjoy by virtue of their membership of the group and their citizenship of the State.  One 
variant of joint governance is ‘consensual accommodation’, the notion that religious tribunals 
should only operate where that is the choice of the group members and that they have the 
freedom and capacity to make that choice. For Shachar, consensual accommodation functions 
‘to permit individuals with multiple affiliations to exercise choice and make their own 
determinations about which legal authority – the state or the group, for example – will have 
their jurisdiction over their personal affairs’.7This raises the issue of how such consent can be 
established. Shachar argued that ‘consensual accommodation must still provide an 
institutional setting that can ensure that vulnerable group members will have the resources to 
choose’.8 This not only requires that there is sufficient information and education; it also 
requires action where the group member is deemed incapable of making that choice because 
they are too young, are under duress or are suffering from a mental illness, for instance.
9
This 
issue was raised immediately following the lecture by Rowan Williams when he was asked 
the question of how it could be ensured that consent to the jurisdiction of a religious tribunal 
was genuine. Williams responded that:    
 
‘I am not postulating a detailed scheme but raising a question about what the most 
fruitful kinds of relationship might be between the law of the state and what I have 
been calling “supplementary jurisdiction”. But I think – and I regard this as an open 
question – were there to be further forms of accommodation, then there would need to 
be, I think, some element of transparency of monitoring that expressed a co-operative 
relationship rather than just parallel tracks’.10 
 
Recent literature resulting from the ‘Social Cohesion and Civil Law: Marriage, Divorce and 
Religious Courts’ Research Project at Cardiff University(hereafter ‘the Cardiff research’) has 
                                                 
7
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8
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9
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explored further the question of what form such ‘monitoring’ could take.11The project 
examined the divorce jurisdiction of three religious tribunals in detail: a Jewish Beth Din; a 
matrimonial tribunal of the Roman Catholic Church; and a Muslim Shariah Council.  The 
Cardiff research found that the different religious tribunals studied had much in common in 
relation to marital disputes in that each of the tribunals firmly recognised and supported the 
ultimate authority of civil law processes when it came to marriage and divorce and none 
sought greater ‘recognition’ by the State. Developing the work of Shachar in light of 
empirical findings, it was demonstrated that the religious tribunal personnel themselves 
claimed that their jurisdiction is consensual.
12
 One interviewee at the Beth Din stated that 
‘People in high places seem to think that we’ve got some sort of official status when we’ve 
got no status whatsoever; it’s consensual for our clients coming here’. The impression given 
was that religious tribunals operate a voluntary jurisdiction and their authority extended only 
to those who choose to submit to them. As one interviewee at the Shariah Council 
commented:  ‘Obviously some people may not decide to come to the Council thinking we’re 
divorced anyway but others feel that they still have to resolve it in the eyes of God and they 
come [to] the Shariah Council’.   
 
Although the Cardiff research primarily called for greater education and contemplated a 
registration / inspection system for religious tribunals, the work subsequently developed 
Shachar’s call for joint governance drawing primarily upon her notion of consensual 
accommodation (alongside temporal and contingent accommodation).
13
 In particular, it was 
suggested that the understanding of consent as found in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 could 
be drawn upon to develop a draft Bill that would outlaw decisions of religious tribunals 
where the parties did not consent. Pursuant to the 2003 Act, there is an absence of consent 
when a person intentionally causes another to engage in an activity without reasonable belief 
that they have consented.
14
Two particular cases would be unlawful regardless of consent, 
                                                 
11
These three case studies should not, of course, be considered to be ‘typical’ or ‘representative’ of Jewish, 
Christian or Islamic tribunals in general. The research team was led by Professor Gillian Douglas and also 
included Professor Norman Doe, Professor Sophie Gilliat-Ray, Dr Russell Sandberg and Asma Khan. 
12
 R Sandberg et al, ‘Britain’s Religious Tribunals: “Joint Governance” in Practice’(2013)  33(2) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 263. 
13
 See ibid and R Sandberg, ‘Conclusion: In Pursuit of Pluralism’ in R Bottoni, R Cristofori and S Ferrari (ed) 
Religious Rules, State Law, and Normative Pluralism – A Comparative Overview(Springer, 2016) 395.  
14
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namely where the parties have committed or been charged with a criminal offence and where 
the tribunal attempts to exercise jurisdiction over a child under the age of 16.
15
 
 
This focus on consent may be criticised. It may be questioned whether religious tribunals 
actually operate a voluntary jurisdiction given that many members are born into a religion 
and community pressure may be a significant factor in keeping people within that group.  The 
appropriation of the understanding of consent found in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 may be 
inappropriate in the context of religious tribunals given the different context and relationship 
between parties and the fact that provisions concerning consent and their application have 
proved controversial in their original context of sexual offences law. This article will 
therefore seek to explore whether the focus should be on the issue of autonomy rather than 
consent. The meaning of autonomy has been the subject of recent scrutiny in the area of 
family law, and so this context is also considered and applied to the minorities within 
minorities debate. Following this, an argument is made for a reconceptualisation of autonomy 
pursuant to ‘relational autonomy’.16 Relational autonomy, according to Mackenzie and 
Stoljar, is designated by a range of perspectives which are, they say:  
 
‘[P]remised on a shared conviction, the conviction that persons are socially embedded 
and that agents’ identities are formed within the context of social relationships and 
shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as race, class, gender 
and ethnicity’.17 
 
It is influenced by different feminist critiques of autonomy, and as is outlined below, it is 
premised on the idea that current understandings of autonomy in law do not represent the 
ways in which people exercise autonomy. As Jennifer Nedelsky puts it: ‘If we ask ourselves 
what actually enables people to be autonomous, the answer is not isolation, but 
                                                 
15
 R Sandberg and F Cranmer, ‘Appendix: Non-Statutory Courts and Tribunals (Consent to Jurisdiction) Bill in 
R Sandberg (ed.) Religion and Legal Pluralism (Ashgate, 2015) 273. 
16
 For a complete overview of relational autonomy in different contexts and from different philosophical 
viewpoints, see C Mackenzie and N Stoljar (eds.), Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, 
Agency and the Social Self(Oxford University Press, 2000). 
17C Mackenzie and N Stoljar, ‘Autonomy Refigured’, in ibid 3, 4. 
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relationships’.18 In the context of religious tribunals, placing these relationships front and 
centre provides a different perspective on the way in which tribunals are engaged with by 
individuals. This article will argue that relational autonomy is therefore a useful approach to 
employ and considers Jonathan Herring’s application of the concept to family law matters. 
Applying relational autonomy to the issue of religious tribunals for the first time, it will be 
argued that relational autonomy ultimately focuses on the limitations on an individual’s 
ability to exercise autonomy as a result of various pressures in relationships, or other wider 
contextual constraints. This is a major step forward but is not by itself sufficient. As a result, 
it is argued that elements of relational autonomy should be merged with another theoretical 
approach known as relational contract theory. The combined approach is named Feminist 
Relational Contract Theory (FRCT) and was initially developed in Prenuptial Agreements 
and the Presumption of Free Choice: Issues of Power in Theory and Practice as a theory that 
emphasises the contractual elements of relationships and the way power is exercised in such 
relationships.
19
  We close by exploring the possibility of applying FRCT to religious tribunals 
and the minorities within minorities debate. 
 
Different Understandings of Autonomy   
The word ‘autonomy’ (or variants of) was not mentioned by Rowan Williams in his lecture. 
To date, the concept has mostly arisen in the context of the religious tribunal debate in 
relation to the autonomy of the religious group. The question of whether State interference 
with the affairs of religious groups in order to ensure the protection of rights secured under 
State law would undermine the autonomy of religious groups has arisen in various different 
contexts.
20
 A recent US Supreme Court decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
21
on the employment status 
of ministers provides the clearest example of the deference to the autonomy of religious 
                                                 
18J Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities’,(1989) 1 Yale Journal of Law and 
Feminism 7, 12. 
19
S Thompson, Prenuptial Agreements and the Presumption of Free Choice: Issues of Power in Theory and 
Practice (Hart/Bloomsbury 2015). 
20
See, e.g., Shergill v Kharia [2014] UKSC 33. For a useful summary of the position see R (on the Application 
of E) v JFS Governing Body [2009] UKSC 15 paras 157-158. 
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groups justifying State inaction.
22
 Chief Justice Roberts held that, ‘the interest of society in 
the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too 
is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, 
and carry out their mission’.23  He held that to treat ministers of religion as employees 
‘interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over 
the selection of those who will personify its beliefs’ and that this was a line that the Supreme 
Court was unwilling to cross.
24
 This focus upon the autonomy of religious groups has been 
developed to suggest that their autonomous nature can be seen as a definitional attribute 
suggesting that the use of the term HALOs (Heterogeneous Autonomous Legal Orders) in 
place of religious law on the basis that the term religious law excludes non-religious systems 
of law and often gives the impression of referring to only to  the ‘revealed’ laws found in 
sacred texts and not the norms, rules and laws generated, interpreted and applied  by religious 
groups as a means to facilitate and order their day to day life.
25
 
 
In family law, however, the concept of autonomy has arisen in a different way. One of the 
most important recent developments has been the focus on individual autonomy as a proxy 
for modern family justice because it is assumed that it is better for individuals to control the 
legal consequences of their own relationships.  Jonathan Herring has highlighted this 
traditional ‘individualist conception of autonomy’ as involving ‘a claim that individuals 
should be allowed to make decisions for themselves and that those decisions should be 
respected by others, unless the decision involves harming someone else’.26 He argued that 
such notions of autonomy have become prevalent in government policy, popular culture and 
in family law given the liberalisation of divorce laws and development of other forms of 
                                                 
22
The existence of a ‘ministerial exception’ was  unanimously approved meaning that ministers of religion were 
not to be treated as employees and therefore could not benefit from legal rights that employees enjoy such as 
anti-discrimination laws. 
23
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission(2012) 132 S.Ct 694. . 
24
 See further J Waltman, ‘Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission: Defining the “Ministerial Exception” in US Employment Law’ (2012) 169 Law & 
Justice 210 and M Hatzis, ‘The Church-Clergy Relationship and Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2013) 15(2) 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 144.  
25
 See R Sandberg, ‘The Impossible Compromise’ in R Sandberg, above n 13, 1. For a defence of the term 
religious law see R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2011) chapter 9. The ‘order’ and 
‘facility’ functions of religious law are identified and discussed by Norman Doe in different contexts see e.g., N 
Doe, The Legal Framework of the Church of England (Clarendon Press, 1996) 33-47. 
26
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mediation and alternative dispute resolution in place of family disputes in court.
27
This 
increased focus on individual autonomy is epitomised, however, by recent case law 
concerning prenuptial agreements (‘prenups’).28 Following the UK Supreme Court decision 
in Radmacher v Granatino
29
in which it was held that ‘the court should give effect to a nuptial 
agreement that is freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications 
unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair to hold the parties to their 
agreement’,30the lower courts have said that:   
 
‘At the heart of that significant change, is the need to recognise the weight that should 
now be given to autonomy, and thus to the choices made by the parties to a marriage. 
... The new respect to be given to individual autonomy means that the fact of an 
agreement can alter what is a fair result and so found a different award to the one that 
would otherwise have been made’.31 
 
This ‘new respect’ for individual autonomy, found not only in relation to prenups but also in 
other family law reforms,
32
represents a shift whereby family disputes are increasingly treated 
as private matters where the role of the law is to enable and encourage the couple to reach an 
agreement.
33
  For Herring, there are a number of reasons for this shift towards autonomous 
decision making including the Government’s drive to reduce expenditure, the ‘heat from 
complaints about the way courts and state bodies make decisions in relation to family matters 
and the rise of the ‘human rights era with an emphasis on respect for private life’. 34 Although 
these points would also apply in relation to religious disputes, interestingly such disputes 
provide an exception to what Gillian Douglas has referred to as ‘the general de-juridification 
of family matters and the drive to encourage alternative dispute resolution’.35 For Douglas, 
                                                 
27
 In terms of popular culture he rather oddly refers to the way in which ‘many of the fictional heroes of our day: 
Jack Bauer, James Bond, Jason Bourne fight alone against the wicked powers that be: they are the epitome of 
the isolated autonomous man’: ibid 2. 
28
 On which see S Thompson, above n 17. 
29
[2010] UKSC 42. 
30
Ibid.,[78]. 
31
V vV [2011] EWHC (Fam) 3230, [36.] 
32
 See A Diduck, ‘Autonomy and Family Justice’ (2016) 28(2) Child and Family Law Quarterly 133. 
33
J Herring, above n 24, 7. 
34
Ibid 7-8. 
35
 G Douglas, ‘Who Regulates Marriage? The Case of Religious Marriage and Divorce’ in R Sandberg above n 
13, 53, 61. 
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the reluctance to accept the role of religious tribunals in determining disputes is perplexing. 
She wrote that:  
 
‘Given this trend away from court adjudication (and even lawyer-assisted bargaining 
in the shadow of the court), it is hard to see why religious tribunals should not be as 
suitable as any other potential mediator or arbitrator to assist the parties in reaching a 
settlement that suits them, even if that settlement is one that reflects cultural or 
religious norms at odds with those of secular society’.36 
 
For Douglas, the neo-liberal roll back of the State and the active role religious groups have in 
a number of areas, such as education, render the controversy surrounding the use of religious 
tribunals for dispute resolution surprising. She went as far as to argue that ‘it would be both 
hypocritical and paradoxical to single out religious groups and religious tribunals to be barred 
from assisting their adherents from obtaining the remedies that the State’s legal system is no 
longer prepared to provide for them’.37  Douglas’ work underscores how the debate on 
religious tribunals can be enhanced by placing it ‘within the context of wider social 
developments concerning the family, and policy initiatives for the de-juridification of family 
disputes’.38The next two sections of this article will explore this claim further: the next 
section will explore the benefit of placing the religious tribunals debate within trends in 
family law generally, while the section following that will return to the work of Herring 
exploring his notion of  ‘relational autonomy’ and its potential application in relation to 
religious tribunals.
39
 
 
Religious Tribunals in the Context of Changes in Family Law  
Family law is always an area in flux, more so than most areas of law. This is because social, 
political and legal understandings and expectations of the family mutate generation to 
generation and indeed even year to year, shaped by changing understandings of the public-
private divide and the role of the State.  However, the social, political and legal changes in 
the early twenty-first century have been especially rapid. There is now much uncertainty as to 
                                                 
36
Ibid 62. 
37
Ibid 64. 
38
Ibid 54. 
39
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which personal relationships the law should recognise and what the proper role of the State 
should be in terms of dealing with family disputes. Marriage has been extended to same sex 
couples but significant exceptions have been carved out allowing religious groups to apply 
the older heterosexual definition of marriage.
40
 There has been little attempt to modernise the  
law on marriage and divorce with recent work by the Law Commission underlining the need 
to revisit the current law on the formalities required for marriage.
41
 Differences between 
marriages and civil partnerships are maintained without clear explanation.
42
 And despite a 
long-standing drive by the Law Commission and others to improve the legal protection of 
unmarried cohabitants, it remains the case that cohabitants have relatively few legal rights. 
Controversies rage about the extent to which and how State authorities should deal with 
family disputes as shown by controversies over whether divorce should be based on fault, the  
extent to which prenuptial agreements should be upheld and how the rights of children should 
be protected.  The severe cuts to legal aid for family law disputes as a result of the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 have reduced the legal assistance 
available in family law disputes, with the effect that people increasingly represent themselves 
or seek solutions out of court.
43
 
 
These significant changes provide a context in which the debate about religious tribunals 
needs to be placed.  The Cardiff research found that Muslims, Jews and Christians all made 
use of religious tribunals in order to obtain licence to remarry within their faith. Typically, 
those who approached the religious tribunals were seeking a termination of their religious 
marriage. Those who were married under English civil law usually had already sought a 
termination of their civil marriage through the civil law of divorce. All three institutions 
expected the parties to obtain a civil divorce, if applicable, before seeking a religious 
termination. It appeared that religious tribunals studied were carrying out a form of 
alternative dispute resolution. This was most clearly the case at the Sharia Council where the 
                                                 
40
 See further, e.g., J Garcia Oliva and H Hall, ‘Same-Sex Marriage: An Inevitable Challenge to Religious 
Liberty and Establishment?’ (2014) 3 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 25 and R Ahdar, ‘Same-Sex 
Marriage: Exemptions for Celebrants and Religious Freedom’ Tensions’ in W C Durham Jr and D Thayler 
(eds.) Religion and Equality: Law in Conflict (Routledge, 2016) 91.  
41
 Law Commission, Getting Married: A Scoping Paper (Law Com, 17 December 2015). On which see C 
Barton, ‘Weddings: The Law Commission’s “Scoping” Paper’ [2016] Family Law 719.  
42See, e.g., R Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (2011) 13 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 157. 
43See, further, e.g., L Trinder and R Hunter, ‘Access to Justice? Litigants in Person before and after LASPO’ 
[2015] Family Law 535; E Hitchings and J Miles, ‘Mediation, Financial Remedies, Information Provision and 
Legal Advice: The Post-LASPO Conundrum’ (2016) 38(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 175.. 
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focus was on determining whether the marriage was no longer workable and there was a 
mandatory mediation stage prior to a ruling being given to see if the marriage couldbe saved, 
conducted by a Family Support Service. The similarities between religious tribunals and 
other forms of mediation and alternative dispute resolution suggest that the use of religious 
tribunals needs to be understood within the context of the move towards quasi-legal and non-
legal means of solving family disputes.  The literature on the minorities within minorities 
issue has raised the important question of whether, and if so when, the State should intervene 
in the decision of a religious tribunal, in order to ensure that there is no discrimination or 
other unlawful treatment on grounds of sex.
44
 It is true that this question needs to be 
addressed in relation to religious tribunals. However, it is also the case that concerns about 
gender equality are likely to not only apply to religious forms of mediation.  The gender 
biases across different legal and quasi-legal systems need attention. Assumptions that 
individuals are equally free to reach mutually beneficial agreements can be especially 
harmful to women because research shows that economic dependencies created by unpaid 
work in the home (which is still disproportionately undertaken by women) is not 
appropriately addressed in private agreements.
45
 There may be a need to revisit the regulation 
of mediation and alternative dispute resolution but the need for such reform is not constrained 
only to religious tribunals.  
 
A further finding of the Cardiff research underscores the need to place the discussion of the 
religious tribunals within the context of family law reform.  In line with other research,
46
it 
was found that over half of the cases dealt with by the Sharia Council studied involved 
couples who had either not married under English civil law or had married abroad and whose 
marital status in English law was unclear.
47
Such litigants have very limited remedies under 
                                                 
44
Individuals from minority ethnic/religious backgrounds who are discriminated against on the grounds of sex 
are examples of minorities within minorities because they can experience multiple and intersecting forms of 
oppression. This can lead to disparities of power between the parties when religious tribunals (or indeed other 
forms of private ordering) are used to resolve intimate arrangements, and in particular family disputes. See, e.g., 
S M Okin et al. (eds), Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women (Princeton University Press, 1999) 7; A Phillips, 
Multiculturalism without Culture (Princeton University Press, 2007) 
45
See S Thompson, above n 17, M Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (The New Press, 
2004), G Brod, ‘Premartial Agreements and Gender Justice’ (1993) 6(2)Yale Journal of Law and Feminism229. 
46
S Shah-Kazemi, Untying the Knot: Muslim Women, Divorce and the Shariah(Nuffield Foundation, 2001) and 
S Bano, above n 3. 
47
 Recognition of an overseas marriage depends on capacity and domicile and some marriages (e.g. potentially 
polygamous) might not have been recognized as valid. 
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English civil law and often did not realise that this was the case: they assumed that their 
religious marriage had legal effect under State law.  The Cardiff research called for greater 
awareness and education concerning the requirements of marriage law, explaining the 
procedural requirements for a civil law marriage and the rights that are accrued as a result of 
marriage. However, this is needed not only in relation to religious tribunals.  Those who have 
a religious marriage but are not married under civil law have the same legal status as other 
cohabiting couples. Unmarried cohabitants also often assume that they have more legal rights 
than they do. The problem of the non-registration of Islamic marriages is, therefore, related to 
the problem of the prevalence of the myth of ‘common law marriage’. It follows that there is 
a need for general reform as to the current law on the formalities required for marriage and 
the legal protection of unmarried cohabitants.  The Cardiff research underscores that it would 
be insufficient to seek to reform religious tribunals in isolation. The issues raised are larger 
than that.  It follows that there is a need to view the minorities within minorities issue within 
the context of developments in family law generally. This is not to say that the use of 
religious tribunals is a new issue. The Cardiff research underscored that it is not.  Religious 
tribunals have existed in this country for a considerable time and have done so mostly non-
contentiously. The reason for the controversy now is in part the result of sociological changes 
concerning the position of religion in society,
48
but is also in part symptomatic of a wider ill-
ease concerning the role of the State in relation to family justice matters. That context means 
that it is appropriate to place the religious tribunals debate within the wider family law 
scholarship on the ‘de-juridification of family disputes’49 and the prevalent individualised 
conception of autonomy.   
 
The Argument for Relational Autonomy 
The work of Herring proposes an alternative conceptualisation of autonomy which he claims 
is more suitable for family law matters. While he notes that ‘independence and freedom have 
become the icons of our age’, he claims that ‘in the context of family law they are false 
gods’.50He suggests an alternative conceptualisation of autonomy – ‘relational autonomy’– 
which is defined in opposition to individualised autonomy: it stresses how our identities are 
                                                 
48
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constantly shaped and re-shaped through the relationships we form with others.
51
Approaches 
based upon relational autonomy have been employed (particularly by feminists) for some 
time.
52
  Herring, applying the concept in relation to family law, emphasises how ‘we find our 
identity and meaning through relationships’ and those seemingly autonomous choices 
(concerning ‘our wishes for our lives’) ‘can only be found by sharing our ideas, aspirations 
and hopes with others’.53It is ‘a model of autonomy which is built around the support of 
relationships’.54Such an approach rejects the modern emphasis upon individualised autonomy 
where ‘the law’s role is to enable to be free from outside interference, to only be subject to 
those obligations that they have chosen to undertake’.55Rather: ‘people are understood as 
relational, interconnected and interdependent. The law’s job is to uphold and maintain 
relationships and to protect people from the abuses that can occur within them’.  Herring 
argues that ‘relational autonomy will seek an active role for the state in forging policies that 
bolster and support relationships’.56 
 
Herring argues that relational autonomy is particularly applicable in relation to family life 
which ‘is not about separation and self-sufficiency. It is about pooling talents and resources 
to work together for the good of the family’.57  He writes that in relation to family law ‘we 
need a law which fosters relationships; which acknowledges that relationships, particularly 
relationships of care, are essential to our societal well-being; and protects people from the 
disadvantages that flow from relationships’.58 This could also apply to religious relationships. 
Traditional religion law approaches that focus on the autonomy of religious groups are 
insufficient since they focus on the group and ignore individual members: they give little 
protection to the agency of those who use religious tribunals and risk discriminating against 
minorities within minorities. Conventional family law approaches stressing individual 
autonomy would also be deficient for the opposite reason in that they focus on individual 
members and ignore their status and constraints as group members: they protect only the right 
                                                 
51
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of individuals to choose between the group and the State, with the State’s role being confined 
to ensuring the ‘right to exit’.59  This approach is inadequate given that it does not recognise 
the power relationships and inequalities that exist. By contrast, an approach based on 
relational autonomy focuses on the relationship between the group members and the group. It 
recognises that those who use religious tribunals have a relationship with the religious group 
but also have a relationship with the State. Such an approach states that members should not 
be given an either-or choice between the group and the State. Moreover, the role of the State 
should be to support and maintain the member’s relationship with the group by facilitating 
religious freedom whilst simultaneously protecting against possible abuse. Herring’s 
application of relational autonomy to family law matters can, therefore, be extended to 
religious tribunals. It provides another route to arriving at Shachar’s concept of joint 
governance because it does not simply view relationships (and the obligations created by 
such relationships) as being confined to the religious group; it focuses upon the individual 
and the group as well as the wider social context in which this relationship takes place. This, 
in turn, ensures the State and religious group are both concurrently responsible for 
individuals.   
 
Relational autonomy can also be seen as protecting the rights of minorities within minorities, 
particularly women in minority ethnic and/or religious groups. For instance, relational 
autonomy is useful in deconstructing orthodox notions of autonomy and consent, and in 
doing so, highlights the problems mainstream individualist notions of autonomy present for 
gender equality. As Herring has put it, ‘privileging individualist autonomy can operate in a 
way that disadvantages women’ by ‘putting central value on the autonomy of the parties to 
leave their relationship and pursue their own life goal’.60The ‘right to exit’ argument can be 
understood as a product of this context. Phillips, for example, denounces the ‘right to exit’ 
rationale as being based on a ‘constructivist account of culture and universalist account of 
human nature’ while Levy points out that ‘to have a culture whose exit is entirely costless ... 
                                                 
59
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is to have no culture at all’. 61 By contrast, an approach based on relational autonomy goes 
further than protecting the ‘right to exit’ by determining additional situations when the State 
should intervene. However, Herring argues that a relational perspective should not respect all 
relationships that people may choose to enter.
62
 Rather, two criteria should be employed: 
first, the law should not protect ‘oppressive relationships which undermine autonomy by 
depriving a party of the opportunity to form their own aspiration and visions of their life’ and 
second, the law should only protect ‘thick’ relationships, that is, those ‘marked by care and 
deep interdependence’.  Relational autonomy, therefore, emphasises the need to take into 
account gender inequalities and the need not to protect oppressive relationships. As Herring 
points out, ‘a relational autonomy perspective is more aware than traditional autonomy of the 
way relationships can impair autonomy’ and this raises the challenge ‘to define how we 
determine which relationships a model of autonomy should promote and which it should 
regard as destructive of autonomy’.  
 
Once oppressive relationships are excluded, the question remains of which relationships 
should be supported. In the context of religious tribunals, a debate can be had as to whether 
all forms of religion should be protected and whether the protection ought to be extended to 
non-religious and cultural groups.
63
 One could take the view that all non-oppressive religious 
relationships can be supported unless they deal with matters outside the group’s competence 
(such as matters concerning criminal sanctions or children).
64
  Herring’s suggested test of 
determining where relationships are ‘thick’ would, however, shift the focus away from the 
status of the tribunal (including the nature of the decision) towards the relationship between 
the member and the group. That said, it is likely that the relationship will be seen as 
sufficiently thick in most cases where there has been a long-term interdependence by virtue 
of the member’s adherence.  The question of which relationships (or which tribunals / legal 
actions), therefore, remains a major unresolved aspect that would need to be developed if 
relational autonomy was to be applied to the religious tribunals debate.  
 
                                                 
61
A Phillips, above n 43, 135; J T Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear (Oxford University Press 2000) 112. 
62
J Herring, above n 24,22. 
63
 See R Sandberg, ‘The Failure of Legal Pluralism’ (2016) 18 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 137 and A Hussain, 
‘Legal Pluralism, Religious Conservatism’ in R Sandberg above n 13,151. 
64
 This is the approach taken in R Sandberg and F Cranmer, above n 13, 273. 
Author Post-Print Copy. This is to appear in the Oxford Journal of Law and Religion  
DOI: 10.1093/ojlr/rww059 
 
16 
 
There are two further unresolved issues with Herring’s application of relational autonomy.  
The first is terminological. From Herring’s work it is clear that the key word in the phrase 
‘relational autonomy’ is ‘relational’ not ‘autonomy’.  Discussion of autonomy is clearly 
preferable to talking of consent in that there can be grades of autonomy but it remains an 
imperfect term. The prevalent understandings of autonomy in religion law and family law 
pollute the term. Moreover, as a matter of logic it cannot be said that both the group and the 
member are completely autonomous. The term ‘relational autonomy’ is in a sense a paradox: 
it instantly recognises by definition that complete autonomy cannot be achieved since we are 
all shaped and limited by our social interactions with one another.  The second unresolved 
issue relates to application.  In Relational Autonomy and Family Law, Herring explained how 
relational autonomy could be usefully applied within family law with particular reference to 
the laws on prenups, adolescent medical decision making and domestic abuse.  Surprisingly, 
in so doing Herring depicted relational autonomy as a rather blunt instrument.
65
In a brief 
mention to mediation, he strangely argued that relational autonomy would oppose 
unregulated mediation (despite the fact that it is unclear who would favour completely 
unregulated mediation).
66
 He then asserted correctly that a relational autonomy approach 
would highlight whether there were power inequalities within the process. He wrote that ‘an 
understanding of the power relationships between the parties mean that we have to 
acknowledge the vulnerabilities of the parties to manipulation and exploitation within the 
mediation process’. However, he then seems to suggest that any suspicion of the possibility 
of an adverse power relationship would mean that agreements would not be enforced: ‘A 
strong argument against the enforcement of prenuptial agreements can be made from the 
perspective of relational autonomy’. 67 He writes that this is because ‘only very rarely can 
                                                 
65
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there be an equality of bargaining power between parties contemplating marriage’68 and 
‘intimate relationships are in their nature fluid’. Applying Herring’s understanding of 
relational autonomy would mean that prenups would not be recognised.  An agreement is 
rarely made in the mutual best interests of the parties, because in most cases, one of the 
spouses is relinquishing the provision to which she would otherwise be entitled in the event 
of divorce.
69
This approach is not only contrary to the direction of English law as shown in 
Radmacher v Granatino
70
but seems to suggest that any agreement made some time ago 
where the relationship is likely to change and where there is a basic inequality between the 
parties will never be enforced under a relational autonomy approach. The benefit of relational 
autonomy is that it appreciates the one-sided nature of agreements like prenups.  However, 
Herring’s application of relational autonomy is too blunt. Setting an agreement aside because 
an individual’s circumstances have rendered them ‘non-autonomous’ is not compatible with 
feminist aims to promote agency and to appreciate that individuals can be autonomous even 
in oppressive circumstances.
71
 Whilst a relational autonomy approach can recognise parties 
as being autonomous in different aspects of their lives, the focus of this perspective still 
operates with a binary understanding of autonomy. And so even when applied in nuanced 
ways, in practice the question is still whether someone has or has not been autonomous in a 
given situation.  
 
Furthermore, different theories of relational autonomy suggest that not everyone would apply 
this approach to family law in the way Herring has. This is because relational autonomy is an 
‘umbrella term’ used in reference to any perspective that looks to the wider context in which 
autonomy is exercised.
72
 This highlights the shortcomings with traditional views of autonomy 
that are based on consent, but the fact that relational autonomy can be used to reach disparate 
outcomes demonstrates a major flaw with the approach; it is elusive in practice, can mean 
different things to different people, and can produce different narratives.
73
In the context of 
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minorities within minorities, it might not have the desired practical impact of both facilitating 
agency and recognising relational inequalities, because it depends on what relational 
autonomy means to the individual applying it.
74
There is evidence to suggest that a relational 
autonomy approach does not lead to significantly different outcomes in practice.
75
Therefore, 
relational autonomy is not entirely appropriate when applied tot he context of religious 
tribunals. Indeed, these issues raise the larger question of what is distinctive about an 
approach based on relational autonomy. Herring contended that it ‘provides an important tool 
of analysis in family law’.76 However, Herring’s application suggests that it is a somewhat 
blunt tool that simply amounts to a call for contextualisation. It may, therefore, be necessary 
to look elsewhere.  
 
Towards Feminist Relational Contract Theory 
Herring’s major contribution in his work on relational autonomy is its emphasis upon the 
importance of relationships. The reason the concept of relationships is of central importance 
in family law is that it provides a framework in which responsibilities, obligations, rights and 
entitlements are both created and reinforced. This, in turn, impacts on the legal consequences 
of distinct categories of relationship, such as the relationship of parent and child, or spouses. 
This is equally true of religion law. Indeed, it has been argued elsewhere that religion law can 
be defined in the same way as family law. For Gillian Douglas, ‘the essence of family law is 
that part of the law which is concerned with the recognition and regulation of certain family 
relationships and the implications of such recognition’.77  Following this, religion law has 
been defined as the part of the law concerned with the recognition and regulation of certain 
religious relationships.
78
 
 
Focusing upon relationships raises the question of whether other relational approaches such 
as relational contract theory could be applied to religious tribunals instead of relational 
autonomy. Like Herring’s explanation of relational autonomy, relational contract theory 
brings the relationships of the parties to the fore. At first glance these approaches are 
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conceptually similar, but importantly an application of relational contract theory to religious 
tribunals could potentially produce a very different outcome. This is because of the theory’s 
focus on contract instead of autonomy. When relational autonomy is the starting point for 
assessing arrangements in the context of religious tribunals, arrangements are less likely to be 
upheld as a result of the many pressures and circumstances that taint one’s ability to exercise 
autonomy. At first glance, this would seem to be a preferable approach to one based on 
contract. As Herring argues, ‘we cannot reduce caring obligations or compensation for losses 
caused by caring into some rigid formula, such as contract.’ 79 However, this is assuming a 
legalistic understanding of contract. A relational approach to contract actually enables the 
flaws with orthodox contractual approaches to be highlighted, which in turn allows the 
assumptions made about the way individuals make decisions to be questioned.  
 
Moving away from orthodox legalistic approaches to contract allow the potential of contract 
to be harnessed. As Martha Fineman has put it: 
 
‘[O]ne of the primary devices for understanding individual and institutional 
relationships is the concept of contract. Contract is the term we apply to all sorts of 
relationships, be they formally established or implied’.80 
 
In the words of Carole Pateman, an analysis focusing on contract need not focus narrowly on 
contract law but can extend instead to ‘contract as a principle of social association and one of 
the most important means of creating social relationships’.81As a result, contract is arguably a 
useful means of understanding relationships and arrangements made in the context of 
religious tribunals because it can be used to highlight the constellation of relationships and 
connections that exist both within religious groups and society as a whole. Instead of 
rejecting contract for being imbued with flawed notions of autonomy, relational contract 
theory instead repurposes contract in a way that recognises the relational context in which 
individuals make decisions. This section will first outline this approach, and then introduce a 
new perspective (Feminist Relational Contract Theory) that combines feminist elements of 
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relational autonomy with relational contract theory to produce a new approach that is focused 
on the power dynamic between parties to an agreement and between individuals and the 
wider institutions to which they belong. 
 
Relational Contract Theory  
Relational contract theory was primarily developed by Ian Macneil.
82
He criticised orthodox 
contract for its focus on agreements as discrete one-off transactions, and for failing to 
recognise the relationships between the parties, as he argued that these relationships 
significantly influence the ways in which decisions are made. For Macneil, highlighting the 
parties’ relationship necessitated a focus on important contextual factors in commercial 
transactions, such as duration and trade customs. This shift in emphasis transforms contract 
into a useful tool. By replacing neo-liberal assumptions that depict contracting parties as 
being purely self-interested and disconnected individuals with a relationship-orientated 
approach, relational contract theory appreciates what Linda Mulcahy refers to as the ‘lived 
world of contracts’.83 It highlights what Pateman has referred to as the ‘fictions of original 
agreements’,84 placing legal contractual concepts such as offer and acceptance within the 
circumstances of the relationship as a whole.     
 
Applied to the context of religious tribunals, the concept of relational contract facilitates 
discussion of the institutional relationships within (and surrounding) religious groups.
85
 
These relationships could be interpreted as contractual when contract is perceived in 
Fineman’s terms as a ‘process whereby individuals are given the means to voluntarily and 
willingly assume obligations and gain entitlements’.86 Indeed, according to English law, the 
organisational structure of many religious groups already depends on a contractual legal 
framework. Legally, religious groups other than the Church of England are understood to 
operate a contractual jurisdiction. They are usually treated as voluntary associations.  The 
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relationship of members as between themselves is governed by quasi-contract and the 
organisations are treated as a matter of law as members of clubs or unincorporated 
associations.  These exist where two or more people voluntarily agree to be bound together 
for common purposes and to undertake mutual duties and obligations. The powers of the 
religious body derive from the agreement of its members. The relationship of the members as 
between themselves is governed by quasi-contract. This contractual bond may be styled the 
doctrine of ‘consensual compact’.87 As Lord Kingsdown acknowledged in Long v Bishop of 
Capetown
88, members ‘may adopt rules for enforcing discipline within their body which will 
be binding on those who, expressly or by implication, have assented to them.’  In the 
Australian case of Scandrett v Dowling
89
 it was held that ‘the binding effect of the “voluntary 
consensual compact”… arises from ‘a willingness to be bound to it because of shared faith’ 
rather than ‘the availability of the secular sanctions of State courts of law’. In relation to the 
Church in Wales, this consensual compact actually takes the form of a statutory contract.  
Section 3(2) of the Welsh Church Act 1914 provided that the existing law of the Church of 
England would continue to bind members of the Church in Wales ‘in the same manner as if 
they had mutually agreed to be so bound’, subject to modification or alteration, according to 
the constitution and regulations of the new institutional Church in Wales. Collective religious 
freedom is already understood in terms of contract under English law.  
 
This means that, although the courts of the State are reluctant to become involved in 
adjudicating internal disputes within religious groups, they will exceptionally intervene to 
enforce the laws of a religious group where there is a financial interest and in relation to the 
disposal and administration of property. This exception to the rule may be styled the Forbes v 
Eden exception, after the leading case.
90
As Sir Robert Phillimore noted in Brown v Curé of 
Montréal
91, although religious groups are to be regarded ‘as a private and voluntary religious 
society resting only upon a consensual basis, Courts of Justice are still bound, when due 
complaint is made that a member of the society has been injured as to his rights, in any matter 
of a mixed spiritual and temporal character, to inquire into the laws or rules of the tribunal or 
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authority which has inflicted the alleged injury.’ Moreover, due to the doctrine of consensual 
compact, where the secular courts do this they will adjudicate the matter by reference to the 
rules and regulations of the religious group. As Lord Cranworth held in Forbes v 
Eden
92
,where courts intervene with regard to the disposal and administration of property they 
‘must necessarily take cognizance of … the rules of a religious association’. In Shergill v 
Khaira
93
 the Supreme Court stated that: ‘The governing bodies of a religious voluntary 
association obtain their powers over its members by contract. They must act within the 
powers conferred by the association’s contractual constitution’. This suggests that a relational 
contract approach to religious tribunals would be fitting given that the member’s agreement 
to comply with the rules and rulings of the religious group is already understood under State 
law to be contractual. 
 
There are examples of civil courts not only applying religious rules as terms of a contract but 
also applying religious agreements as contracts. The Cardiff research found that the religious 
tribunals studied were determining questions of religious status and Bowen has correctly said 
that ‘granting an Islamic divorce has no legal effect in and of itself, and so the language of 
contracts and enforcement does not belong there’. 94 However, as he notes, there has been ‘a 
partial opening of courts towards private arbitration of divorce, and even to arbitration 
conducted by religious bodies’.95 Civil courts have approved agreements reached by 
arbitration that covers financial and property disputes arising from relationship breakdown.  
In S v S
96
 the court approved an agreement between a divorcing couple and recognised this as 
part of the ‘strong policy argument in favour of the court giving effect to an agreement that 
the parties have come to themselves for the resolution of their financial affairs following 
divorce’.97 Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division, stressed that such agreements 
would only be enforced if they were decided in accordance with the law of England and 
Wales and provided that there was no reason to believe that ‘there may have been gender-
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based discrimination’.98 He left open the question of what would happen ‘where an arbitral 
process is based on a different system of law’. That question was seemingly answered in AI v 
MT
99
where the High Court accommodated and buttressed the parties’ wish for their 
matrimonial dispute to be arbitrated under rabbinical law at the New York Beth Din. Baker J 
held that this would give ‘regard to the parties’ devout religious beliefs and wish to resolve 
their dispute through the rabbinical court’ and acknowledged ‘that it [is] always in the 
interests of parties to try to resolve disputes by agreement wherever possible’.100 The High 
Court endorsed the parties proposal on the basis that  ‘the outcome, although likely to carry 
considerable weight with the court, would not be binding and would not preclude either party 
from pursuing applications to this court in respect of any of the matters in issue’.101 The 
subsequent arbitration agreement was upheld by the court but Baker J was insistent that this it 
did not ‘necessarily follow that a court would be content in other cases to endorse a proposal 
that a dispute concerning children should be referred for determination by another religious 
authority. Each case will turn on its own facts’.102 
 
Civil courts have also enforced nuptial agreements made in a religious context. Bowen 
discusses two cases that concern whether agreements to give a marriage gift can be enforced 
following the breakup of the marriage.
103
 In the first case, Shahnaz v Rizwan
104
a couple 
married in India with a marriage agreement that stipulated payment on divorce.  Winn J held 
that ‘the right to dower, once it has accrued as payable, is a right in action, enforceable by a 
civil action without taking specifically matrimonial proceedings’ and could be enforced as a 
‘proprietary right’.105Bowen argues that framing it as a proprietary right 'insulated the mahr 
agreement’ against the objection that ‘the agreement was a kind of pre- or ante-nuptial 
contract'.
106
 For Bowen, this was unsatisfactory since regarding it as a contractual obligation 
would require judges ‘to know the parties’s understandings, including whether the parties 
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intended to be enforceable in law’. In the second case, however, the court did enforce the 
marriage gift as a contractual obligation. Uddin v Choudhury
107
 concerned a religious (and 
legally unregistered) marriage. The Court of Appeal refused the application of the father-in-
law for his wedding gift to be returned it was held that gifts were gifts and did not need to be 
returned.
108
 However, the bride succeeded in her counter-claim for payments of dowry, which 
she said had been agreed prior to the marriage, but had not been paid. Mummery LJ held that 
‘This was not a matter of English law. There was no ceremony which was recognised by 
English law, but it was a valid ceremony so far as the parties were agreed and it was valid for 
the purposes of giving legal effect to the agreement which had been made about gifts and 
dowry’.109 Crucially, he noted that ‘as a matter of contract arising out of the agreement which 
the parties had made, ... the judge was entitled in law to say that this was an enforceable 
agreement.’110 As Bowen has noted: 
 
'a number of important acts - giving jewellery to relatives, promising mahr to the 
wife, writing a marriage contract, dissolving a marriage - were taken as having a clear 
Islamic content and an English legal effect in the law of contracts. ... In this sense the 
civil judges recognized, not shari'a, but contractual acts taken in an Islamic context'.
111
 
 
These cases suggest that civil courts are increasingly applying a contractual approach to 
enforce religious agreements. As Bowen puts it, rather than recognising Sharia per se, courts 
have conceptualised religious agreements ‘in terms of English contract law’.112This would 
underscore the need for a contractual analysis. This approach has been adopted by the Law 
Commission which has recommended that qualifying nuptial agreements (that is, marital 
agreements such as prenups that comply with a number of procedural requirements) to be 
made legislatively binding, 
113
 and  deliberately did not make any separate proposals for 
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‘religious marriage contracts’,114 noting that such agreements would be enforceable in the 
same way prenups meeting the qualifying criteria would be. The Law Commission justified 
their reluctance to give religious agreements special protection on the basis that providing 
more or less legal protection by virtue of being a member of a faith group ‘would be 
discriminatory’ and that ‘Those who wish to make, and to abide by, religious marriage 
contracts will always be free to do so subject to the constraints of the legal obligations and to 
society as a whole’.115 
 
However, Bowen criticises the adoption of a contractual analysis  on the basis that it takes 
‘Islamic law to be a set of contract-orientated rules, independent of social context’116This 
further suggests the need for an approach based on relational contract theory. Such an 
approach can apply to religious groups generally in that membership of religious groups is 
seen as contractual (both legally and socially) but can also be applied in relation to religious 
agreements which now seem to be capable to be enforced in the same way as a prenup.  
However, just because religious agreements are legally treated as being contractual, that does 
not mean that a contractual analysis is necessarily the best way of understanding them,  Since 
relational contract theory was developed by Macneil in the commercial sphere, it is arguably 
not entirely appropriate for application to religious tribunals. For instance, relational contract 
theory might not be sensitive enough to the numerous power imbalances experienced by 
minorities within minorities, particularly on gender lines. As a result, Feminist Relational 
Contract Theory is arguably more appropriate in this context, because it combines feminist 
perspectives that highlight power imbalances with Macneil’s relational contract approach. 
Focusing on gender creates ‘disturbances in the field - that inverts or scrambles familiar 
narratives of stasis, recovery or progress’ and ‘advances rival perspectives’.117 
 
Feminist Relational Contract Theory 
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Feminist Relational Contract Theory (FRCT) is an approach developed by Thompson
118
 and 
incorporates feminist perspectives that explicitly address power imbalances(especially those 
that are gendered), where relational contract theory otherwise would not. Feminism in this 
context is a tool that enables recognition of particular inequalities on gender lines. This is 
particularly useful when thinking about power because feminism directs critical fire at how 
social and legal structures reinforce power imbalances. By choosing to explicitly recognise 
this, in other words, to not be silent on the gendered dimensions of the minorities within 
minorities debate, issues of power are placed at the core of the discussion instead of on the 
margins. An explicitly feminist perspective is has often been applied to the minorities within 
minorities debate and is one of the most important aspects of a relational approach. This 
might not be obvious at first, as women in minority communities arguably are just as 
susceptible to religious or racial discrimination as they are to discrimination based on gender. 
But a feminist approach does not only emphasise the gendered power inequalities faced by 
minorities within minorities; rather, it emphasises the diversity of individuals in these 
positions.
119
In doing so, individuals are able to resist the assumption that as members of a 
religious group or community, they are automatically replicating that group or community’s 
interests and identities.
120
An emphasis on relational autonomy recognises this intersectional 
context, but FRCT is able to build on this perspective by focusing on contract instead of on 
individual autonomy. FRCT, therefore, builds upon the strengths of both relational autonomy 
and relational contract theory. 
 
The minorities within minorities context provides an opportunity to demonstrate the scope of 
a contractual approach when employing FRCT. By focusing on contractual relationships 
rather than solely on the individual, religious tribunals can be viewed as comprised of 
contractual relationships on multiple levels. First is the ‘consensual compact’ between an 
individual and the religious group they are a member of. Secondly, a contractual relationship 
underpins the arrangements affecting individuals within religious groups. Thirdly, FRCT can 
appreciate the relationship between a religious group and the state, which could be conceived 
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as a type of social contract.
121
The advantage of recognising contractual relationships in these 
different ways is that FRCT opens up the possibility for the system in which the law 
legitimises agreements to be challenged. This is particularly important in light of Carol 
Smart’s observation about the power law has to arrive at its own version of truth, based on 
norms that may not reflect the experiences of the parties to an agreement.
122
 Therefore, it is 
not enough to employ relational autonomy in a way that highlights gendered power 
imbalances between parties; FRCT is needed in order to recognise that law is in part 
responsible for these imbalances, because as Smart has said law is ‘structured on patriarchal 
precedents’.123 In short, FRCT does not simply aim to operate within law to produce solutions 
to issues of power in contract, because it recognises that law might be part of the problem. 
 
FRCT is required since current approaches are shaped by and perpetuate notions and values 
of individualist autonomy. By focusing on the autonomy of the parties, the resolution of the 
matter at hand still resides in the private sphere. This is arguably one of the reasons that 
relational autonomy is not successful in practice, because as Martha Fineman has put it, ‘the 
characterisation of the family as the preeminent private space carries with it a set of 
assumptions about family relationships’.124The contractual approach taken by civil courts 
does not refer to any preference or intention expressed by the parties, rather, the parties are 
deemed autonomous simply because they have consented to an arbitral award being made. 
Indeed, Sir James Munby’s view is that, ‘[t]here is no conceptual difference between the 
parties making an agreement and agreeing to give an arbitrator the power to make the 
decision for them’.125 Respectfully, this plainly does not appreciate the context in which 
decisions are made. Indeed, the ‘new respect’ for autonomy pursuant to the Supreme Court 
decision Radmacher v Granatino appears to rule out the need for any further scrutiny by the 
court, as the President also noted that the judge ‘will not need to play detective unless 
something leaps off the page to indicate that something has gone so seriously wrong in the 
arbitral process as fundamentally to vitiate the arbitral award’.126 Thus, in cases such as AI v 
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MT ,
127the determination of all of the parties’ affairs on divorce by a New York Beth Din was 
approved by the court for being ‘unobjectionable’.128 Commentators such as Alison Diduck 
are critical of this approach because “unobjectionable” is a far cry from “fair”, the objective 
in English law’.129 By failing to consider fairness in this case, the parties were denied access 
to the opportunity in English law to have their dispute resolved in a way that ensures the 
outcome is fair for both parties.
130
 Diduck also comments on other factors missed as a result 
of superficial judicial analysis of private arbitration: 
 
‘The fact that it is … staffed by what could be seen as a self-regulated bench, 
accountable only to its own professional organisation and the parties who hire it, and 
whose decisions are confidential and reviewable by courts only on the narrowest of 
grounds, appears unimportant [to the court]’.131 
 
A focus on autonomy, even relational autonomy, is not the most effective way of 
emphasising contextual factors such as these. There are multiple levels of contractual 
relationships in this situation. There is a need to focus on the individual’s agreement for the 
religious tribunal to decide the matter within the wider context of multiple power 
relationships. This involves exploring in detail not just the agreement and the conditions 
surrounding it but a number of interlocking relationships over a much longer period: this 
would include looking at the entire relationship between the individual member and the 
group, the relationship between the two parties the case is concerned with, as well as family 
and community pressures and the gendered aspects of the decision-making process and court 
personnel. Another important consideration would be the context spanning the whole period 
in which the parties were members of the religious community, as focusing on the discrete 
moment in which the arbitration was elected potentially leaves important contextual factors 
out.
132
The factors highlighted by Diduck above, such as who the religious authority figures 
are, to whom they are accountable and so forth would also be significant pursuant to FRCT, 
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because they provide an important contextual basis for understanding the power dynamic 
between the parties and arbitrators, and also facilitate a critical discussion of the power of 
religious law in reaching particular conclusions. Taking AI v MT
133
as an example, a major 
difference in application between FRCT and other approaches is that the former would 
consider the different, yet interconnected (legal and social) contractual relationships at play: 
between the parties in electing orthodox Jewish faith-based arbitration, between the parties 
and the New York Beth Din, and between the Beth Din and English court. Focusing on the 
way in which power is exercised in these contractual relationships would lead the court to ask 
different questions. For instance, an FRCT approach would not assume that each individual 
party had chosen all of the consequences decided by the Beth Din because they are a member 
of that religious community. A FRCT based approach would mean that the answer to the 
question of whether State authorities should enforce or intervene into the agreements made 
by or at religious tribunals will always be fact specific taking into account not just the 
agreement and its context but also the wider and multiple power relationships that are in play. 
To date, the concern about minorities within minorities has focused mostly upon the 
relationship between the religious group and the State. Recent work originating from the 
Cardiff research has broadened this to extend the focus to group members who in Shachar’s 
work are jointly governed by the group and the State but who also enjoy social agency.
134
 
However, there is a need to go much further than this.  
 
FRCT provides a means by which this could be achieved. Relational autonomy by itself is 
insufficient. The best relational autonomy can do is to conclude that one of the parties was 
not autonomous as a result of pressure from the other party, the religious group or other 
contextual factors, and so the agreement should not be given effect. This is too blunt an 
instrument of analysis since it would mean that agreements would be set aside denying the 
agency of the parties. It is important to not presume a lack of individual autonomy when there 
is evidence of oppression or systematic subordination. Diana Meyers argues that individuals 
experiencing multiples forms of oppression and structural inequality can still be partially 
autonomous and it should not be assumed they are unable to be autonomous because of 
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structural constraints.
135
This is why a feminist approach needs to be applied to relational 
contract theory.  A contractual approach that brings the relationship, and in particular, issues 
of power to the fore can potentially facilitate a more nuanced conclusion and solution. There 
should be other options beyond simply approving or rejecting the agreement or decision.  
In AI v MT136, Baker J commented that the case illustrated the principle in Rowan Williams’ 
lecture that ‘citizenship in a secular society should not necessitate the abandoning of religious 
discipline, any more than religious discipline should deprive one of access to liberties secured 
by the law of the land, to the common benefits of secular citizenship’.137 Baker J noted that 
‘at a time when there is much comment about the antagonism between the religious and 
secular elements of society, it was notable that the court was able not only to accommodate 
the parties’ wish to resolve their dispute by reference to their religious authorities, but also 
buttress that process at crucial stages’. This is to be welcomed but more can be done and 
FRCT provides a way by which this can be achieved.  
 
Conclusion: The Relative Importance of Autonomy 
The hyperbolic reaction to Rowan Williams’ lecture has been repeated at regular intervals in 
recent years whenever any aspect of sharia law becomes newsworthy.
138
 This has been 
reflected in headlines like ‘Sharia courts “as consensual as rape”, House of Lords told’.139 
However, as the academic literature resulting from the Cardiff research has shown, religious 
tribunals are actually as consensual as sex: the use of religious tribunals is sometimes 
consensual and sometimes not consensual.
140
This has led to a focus on what Shachar referred 
to as consensual accommodation:
141
 the understanding that religious tribunals should only be 
permitted to operate where their jurisdiction is consensual in that parties have the freedom 
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and capacity to make that choice. This article, however, has explored whether the focus ought 
to be on the issue of autonomy rather than consent. It was found that both the focus on group 
autonomy in religion law and individualised autonomy in family law were insufficient but 
that the second did point to the need to place concerns about religious tribunals within the 
broader context of significant changes within family law. This family law context presented a 
further and preferable notion of autonomy: the idea of relational autonomy as applied in the 
family law context by Herring.
142
 
 
Herring’s work is important in that it provides an understanding of autonomy based on the 
forming of relationships rather than the usual focus on the autonomy of the religious group or 
on the individualised autonomy of those who use religious tribunals. However, this does not 
go far enough, and there is evidence to suggest that a relational autonomy approach does not 
lead to significantly different outcomes in practice.
143
 By applying relational autonomy to the 
context of religious tribunals, a number of shortcomings with the application of Herring’s 
work were identified. In particular, it was suggested that the term was a paradox and that 
important word was ‘relational’ rather than ‘autonomy’. This led to a discussion of relational 
contract theory as an alternative relational approach. The way in which English law regards 
collective religious freedom as contractual and the trend whereby religious agreements are 
increasingly being regarded as contractual showed the value of a contractual approach. 
However, relational contract theory was considered to pay insufficient attention to the power 
(im)balances that exist. This led to the adoption of an approach that builds upon both 
relational autonomy and relational contract theory employing a feminist perspective to direct 
critical fire at the power relationships that exist and are perpetuated at multiple levels.  
 
Feminist Relational Contract Theory is preferable to the narrowly constrained notion of 
consent and the focus upon autonomy, even Herring’s notion of relational autonomy.  There 
is a desperate need for a change of approach in this area.  The court’s fixation on consent 
perpetuates an individualist notion of autonomy which is blind to all but the most blatant 
gender inequalities.  As the President of the Family Law Division has said, ‘it can only be in 
the rarest of cases that it will be appropriate for the judge to do other than approve the 
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[award]’.144This means that there is a very high threshold before the court will inspect 
agreements and decisions made. Feminist Relational Contract Theory could provide a way 
forward that uses contract to uphold and legitimise decisions made within religious tribunals, 
whilst recognising the instances in which individuals are not able to exercise power in 
decision making. This approach, created and applied in relation to prenups,
145
 could be 
potentially applied to a number of other agreements and relationships within and outside 
family law. It has the potential to encourage judges (both religious and civil) to place the 
claim before them into its wider context, taking into account a number of interlocking 
relationships over a period of time and playing particular attention to the power dynamic to 
reach conclusions and solutions that are more ambitious than the existing binary outcomes. In 
an age where the concept of the family and the role of family law are in flux, Feminist 
Relational Contract Theory even has the potential to demarcate the boundaries of family law, 
determining which relationships are subject to regulation by being the product of relational 
contracts and providing an ambitious way by which disputes can be resolved that recognises 
that relationships are both legal and social constructs.  
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